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Abstract
The literature within library and information science (LIS)
on relevance comes primarily from the subﬁelds of information retrieval
and information systems design. This literature has developed over time
from an orthodoxy that has focused on relevance as an objective measure
to a comprehension of the dynamic nature of relevance judgment. Other
literatures, such as those of the philosophy of language and semantics, also
have offered cogent thought that could and should be incorporated into
LIS. This thought has broadened discussion to the context in which rele-
vance is assessed, the speech acts that are evaluated, and the dialogic ele-
ment of human communication.
An individual may use any number of ways to begin an examination of rele-
vance. One beginning is provided by Fred Dretske in his Knowledge and the
Flow of Information. Dretske acknowledges the usefulness of quantitative the-
ory applied to information but asserts that such theory is limited in that it
cannot elucidate the nature of meaning or tell us about the meaning of a
particular statement. He says that “if we consult a dictionary, we ﬁnd in-
formation described most frequently in terms of “intelligence,” “news,” “in-
struction,” and “knowledge.” These terms are suggestive. They have a com-
mon nucleus. They all point in the same direction—the direction of truth.
Information is what is capable of yielding knowledge, and since knowledge
requires truth, information requires it also” (Dretske, 1981, p. 45). Dret-
ske’s notion may make us wonder about the connection between informa-
tion and knowledge.
The role of relevance as it relates to knowledge will recur in this pa-
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per, but some background should guide this exploration of the philosophy
of relevance. Fortunately for us, Stefano Mizzaro (1997) undertook an ex-
haustive review of the information science (IS) literature relating to rele-
vance. His work renders a descriptive literature review here unnecessary;
readers should consult his article and its extensive bibliography. In setting
the tone for his review, Mizzaro acknowledged that IS approaches to rele-
vance tend to cluster around two groups—one centering on the object, or
bit of information, and the other centering on the human element. The
ﬁrst group (the object cluster) includes three entities according to Mizza-
ro: a document, a surrogate (or representation of a document), and infor-
mation (or what the reader apprehends from a document). The second
group includes a problem faced by the information-seeker, an information
need (deﬁned as a mental representation of the problem), a request (a
natural language expression of a need), and a query (or system language
expression of a need) (p. 811). He then posited, “Now, a relevance (sic)
can be seen as a relation between two entities, one from each group: The
relevance of a surrogate to a query, or the relevance of a document to a re-
quest, or the relevance of the information received by the user to the in-
formation need, and so on” (p. 811).
We can take for granted, for the purposes of this examination, that
Mizzaro’s observations regarding relevance provide a reasonably accurate
and accepted summary of IS inquiry and system development work. They
do, however, raise some questions for more broadly deﬁned philosophical
treatment of relevance. Inherent in his set of clusters (particularly for the
ﬁrst, object-based, group) is the assumption that relevance applies prima-
rily to verbal communication. Further, the assumption is that this commu-
nication is formal and structured, that is, it can be shaped and presented
in the form of a document. Granted, “document” can be an encompassing
idea, but a formal structure inheres in it, even if it is not intended to be
limited to a physical artifact that would satisfy a popular notion of what a
document is. An assumption that is evident with regard to the second clus-
ter is that humans initiate a process whereby information is sought and
located. Further, the two clusters combined (as Mizzaro did to deﬁne rele-
vance) suggest a structured human action that entails the making of speciﬁc
kinds of judgments about objects by people. This model is not particularly
problematic (on the face of it) as far as it goes, but it does not go far enough.
There are information-related human actions that do not ﬁt so neatly into
the clusters, much less into the individual elements of the clusters.
This very brief bit of background serves to demonstrate some of the
complications one faces when examining relevance. There is no way that a
paper of this length can possibly address all deﬁnitions, uses, and implica-
tions of the word relevance; what is presented here is a selection of some
ways of thinking about relevance. One point needs to be made immediate-
ly: whether stated or not, relevance judgments are fundamentally construed
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in epistemological terms, that is, the aim of a relevance judgment is, in the
end, to foster or justify knowledge. First, a few approaches from library and
information science (LIS) will be discussed. Following that, some potentially
fruitful philosophical ideas will be dealt with. The desired result is (i) a
realization of the complexity of any notion of relevance; (ii) an understand-
ing that different starting points for an examination of relevance may well
lead to different conclusions; and (iii) while philosophers do not appear
to address relevance directly, many do give serious attention to matters that
impinge on our understanding of relevance.
LIS and Relevance
While Mizzaro provided a succinct summary of IS writings and thought
on relevance, a few speciﬁc works from the past have been especially inﬂuen-
tial or have provided examples of particular schools of thought regarding
relevance. The ﬁrst, and what for many readers may be the most striking,
aspect of the LIS literature is that the preponderance of writing on rele-
vance comes from IS (including the subﬁelds of information systems de-
sign and information retrieval). Very little is present in the literature about
libraries that directly addresses relevance (apart from systems-related con-
cerns). In works on the reference function in libraries, for instance, a tacit
assumption is that the process is intended to help library users ﬁnd mate-
rials and information that they will ﬁnd useful, but little reference to writ-
ings on relevance itself exists. It could (and probably should) be argued that
greater attention to the complexity of relevance and how individuals may
make relevance judgments is vitally important to the essence of the library’s
reason for being. Formal examination of relevance, both as an idea and as
a phenomenon, tends to be found in such journals as the Journal of the
American Society for Information Science and Technology and Information Process-
ing and Management. Whether practicing librarians read these journals to
learn more about things like relevance is an open question.
Given that the literature of IS tends to be the home of discourse on
relevance, it is essential that the substance of that discourse be considered
here. It should be noted with some emphasis that what follows is a focus
on some particular, but representative, ideas about relevance; what is cov-
ered here is by no means exhaustive. While Mizzaro did review a large
amount of literature, a few rather consistent themes recur. Moreover, the
themes seem to have a kind of temporal aspect, that is, at one point in time
a sort of orthodoxy prevailed, and over time alternative conceptions of
relevance have been articulated. The orthodoxy tends to ﬁt into Mizzaro’s
ﬁrst cluster that centers on the document (and the information system).
About four decades ago William Goffman’s approach expressed a particu-
lar, and apparently widely held, view of relevance assessment. In his article
he (Goffman, 1964) wrote that “relevance can be deﬁned as a measure of
information conveyed by a document relative to a query” (p. 201). There
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are some conceptual and practical difﬁculties with such a view. For one
thing, nowhere in the article is “information” deﬁned; for another, a de-
terministic theorem and proof are presented as rationale for the measure-
ment of relevance (recall Dretske’s skepticism regarding the sufﬁciency of
quantitative theory). Perhaps more fundamentally, relevance is explicitly
referred to as a measure. The assumption underlying the claim is that rel-
evance is a physical, or at least a tangible, thing that can be assigned a quan-
titative value, and that value can be related to the value of other variables,
such as information.
A similar way of deﬁning relevance was expressed a bit later by W. S.
Cooper (1971). He said, “A stored sentence is logically relevant to (a repre-
sentation of) an information need if and only if it is a member of some
minimal premiss (sic) set of stored sentences for some component statement
of that need” (p. 24). Inherent in this deﬁnition is a very speciﬁc equation
of relevance with representation; it embodies what Alvin Goldman (1993)
called a representational heuristic. This is “the tendency to judge the prob-
ability that an object x belongs in category C by the degree to which x is
representative of, or similar to, typical members of category C” (pp. 26–27).
Such a heuristic may be entirely effective for certain cognitive processes and
informational needs, such as the search for documents or statements that
have direct bearing on a claim. Suppose a student or a scholar is examining
a claim that an economic policy decision was made in a particular U.S. pres-
idential administration for the primary purpose of helping win votes in an
upcoming election. That person would probably seek documents that ad-
dress the claim rather directly, that is, that discuss the political implications
for the speciﬁc policy decision. In such an instance, the heuristic described
by Goldman holds. Suppose, however, we consider the description of a
method of inquiry by the historian William H. McNeill: “I get curious about
a problem and start reading up on it. What I read causes me to redeﬁne the
problem. Redeﬁning the problem causes me to shift the direction of what
I’m reading. That in turn further reshapes the problem, which further re-
directs the reading. I go back and forth like this until it feels right, then I
write it up and ship it off to the publisher” (Gaddis, 2002, p. 48). McNeill’s
experience describes a different kind of cognitive process; in his account
what Goldman refers to as categorization is dynamic, not ﬁxed. Because the
category is dynamic, representation is likewise dynamic and shifting. No lin-
ear algorithm is sufﬁcient to account for McNeill’s process.
Following Cooper were the beginnings of alternative conceptions of
relevance. The ﬁrst expressions of alternative discourse were still substan-
tively grounded in the orthodoxy, but some discomfort with that orthodoxy
seems apparent. Building upon Cooper’s work, Patrick Wilson (1973) add-
ed a reﬁnement, which he called situational relevance. The situation, or
context, within which an information-seeker assesses the relevance of a
document or an utterance implies a logical functioning that differs from
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the one Cooper suggested. In addition to what may begin as a deductive
process, iterative steps of reading, inference, and continued searching
necessitate, according to Wilson, probabilistic evaluation of each item plus
induction stemming from the reading of those retrieved items. On the face
of it, Wilson’s addition of these stages appears to be only a small twist to
the structure that Cooper, Goffman, and others posited. In actuality, the
logical complication Wilson interjected begins to resemble more closely the
complex process summarized by McNeill. The melding of deduction and
induction (and McNeill’s anecdote clearly supports this melding) stresses
that the ultimate judgment of relevance in all but the most simple instances
is a nonlinear and rich process.
Abraham Bookstein (1979), following Cooper and Wilson, added some
potentially complicating ideas to relevance assessment. He admitted that
“an information retrieval system cannot predict with certainty a patron’s
reaction to a document, and this, we believe, is the source of many of the
uses found in the literature for the term ‘relevance.’ [At this point Book-
stein seems to be migrating from that cluster of the literature centering on
the document to the cluster dealing with the user, but the continuation of
his thought suggests otherwise.] Rather, the system transforms both the doc-
ument and the request into forms it can manipulate, and on the basis of
these, it assesses the relevance of the document to the user” (p. 269). He
further deﬁned relevance in terms of a user’s satisfaction with the output
of a system. This idea begs some questions, including what constitutes sat-
isfaction (is it in fact the retrieval of topical, or more narrowly, linguistical-
ly related, documents) and how does an information retrieval system accom-
plish the goal of satisfaction. These are not trivial questions; if a user’s query
is reduced to linguistically morphological form (and it must be added that
sophisticated systems approach more semantically related goals), then as-
sessment is a simpliﬁed, but far less meaningful, task. Since satisfaction is
not uncommon in library-related discourse, the questions (and the associ-
ated problems) also apply.
Some other IS writings introduce some evaluative mechanisms that can
reinforce the objective idea of information. These measures recur in sever-
al sources, but two examples of their statement will sufﬁce for illustrative pur-
poses. In her book on information retrieval, Miranda Pao (1989) summa-
rized two measures that are intended to help assess relative effectiveness and
utility of searching for and retrieving information. These two measures are
(i) recall (the number of relevant items retrieved divided by the number of
relevant items in the database) and (ii) precision (the number of relevant
documents retrieved divided by the total number of retrieved items) (p. 59).
These measures are problematic inasmuch as they either leave “relevance”
undeﬁned or assume that items and documents can objectively be catego-
rized as relevant or not relevant (with little or no middle ground). A more
fundamental underlying assumption imbedded in such instrumental mea-
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sures is that relevance, once a search is expressed, is a property that inheres
in the document retrieved. There may be an admission that some informa-
tion-seeker is making a relevance judgment about the members of a set of
documents, but there remains the operational procedure of treating rele-
vance as something that is of the document. The measures also are referred
to by Michael Buckland (1991, p. 101). Buckland, however, recognized the
semantic challenges of claiming that a relevance judgment is an objective
one. While admitting that ascribing relevance to a document, as part of the
execution of the recall and precision measures, is a matter of treating in-
formation as a thing, he readily admitted that information also can be per-
ceived as knowledge and as a process. Both of these conceptions transcend
the limited view of relevance as objective.
The shift from orthodox to alternative ideas concerning relevance is
well-illustrated in an article by Linda Schamber, Michael Eisenberg, and
Michael Nilan (1990). They reviewed traditional and nontraditional con-
ceptions of relevance judgments and demonstrate a shift from static to
dynamic factors. In summary they concluded that
1. Relevance is a multidimensional cognitive concept whose meaning is
largely dependent on users’ perceptions of information and their own
information-need situations.
2. Relevance is a dynamic concept that depends on users’ judgments of the
quality of relationships between information and information-need at
a certain point in time.
3. Relevance is a complex but systematic and measurable concept if ap-
proached conceptually and operationally from a user’s perspective. (p.
774)
The third point relies on conﬁdence in formal relevance judgment as a
rational process. While some might challenge such a view, its debate is be-
yond the scope of our concern here. One thing that is of some importance
here is the nature of knowledge itself. A reductionist view of knowledge
would hold that knowledge is subject to either an internalist (all knowledge
resides inside the individual knower’s mind) or an externalist (all knowl-
edge is grounded outside the knower’s mind) stance. It seems clear that
the orthodox view of relevance is externalist; assessments of the relevance
of speciﬁc documents are possible primarily because of properties of the
documents themselves.
The third point articulated by Schamber et al. presents a difﬁcult, but
essential, characteristic of relevance. If we were to take a purely externalist
stance regarding knowledge, and if we make relevance analogous to knowl-
edge, then relevance would necessarily be external to the information-seek-
er, and researchers could conceivably evaluate the relevance of documents.
If, on the other hand, we were to take an internalist stance regarding justiﬁ-
cation (the grounds for generating belief about a claim or statement), and
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if relevance were analogous to justiﬁcation, then relevance would necessarily
be within the information-seeker. Rober Audi (1998) in his book on epis-
temology convincingly argued that knowledge and justiﬁcation are, to an
important extent, separate and that an externalist view of knowledge com-
bined with an internalist view of justiﬁcation is legitimate, and that, further,
justiﬁcation is important to knowledge (pp. 237–238). Taking a cue from
Audi, it may be that we need to look at relevance as dually external and
internal to the information-seeker. Some object is read and evaluated, but
the evaluation ( justiﬁcation) is an outcome of rational, internal processes.
In other words, some meaning inheres in a document (external) and the
meaning is contextualized and assessed by a user (internal).
Some recent work in IS incorporates the complex epistemological
notion of combined internalist and externalist factors. Stephen Harter
1992) recognized the methodological challenges of discarding ideas of
ﬁxed relevance but asserts that matters of topicality are less important than
assessment of cognitive change in the information-seeker. Harter drew, in
part, from work on the cognitive elements of relevance as set forth by Dan
Sperber and Deirdre Wilson (1986), about which more will be said later.
In his introduction to a special issue of the Journal of the American Society for
Information Science, Thomas Froehlich (1994) offered a particular means of
broadening the discourse on the matter, tacitly incorporating the dualist
principle suggested by Audi. Froehlich wrote, “Hermeneutics can provide
a productive framework for modeling systems and user criteria” (p. 130).
He described some of the factors that impinge on a hermeneutics of rele-
vance, including the realization that users interpret their needs to and for
themselves, understanding how documents become part of an information
collection such as a library, and determining how a user’s query in inter-
preted by and through an information system (p. 130). The addition of the
interpretive element was not entirely new with Froehlich; hints of it were
offered by David Ellis (1984) who noted the need to take into account the
perception of the user and the impact of that perception on relevance judg-
ments. With the introduction of hermeneutics, Froehlich made apparent
how the interpretive process can itself be examined, without ignoring the
intentional nature of system creation and development.
One of the most sophisticated assessments of relevance as a concept
was that of Birger Hjørland. In one of his works, Hjørland (1997) remind-
ed us that awareness of relevance coincides with an explicit awareness of
information need; the criteria to evaluate the relevance of a document are
ineluctably attached to the need itself (p. 172). In this the simultaneous
internal and external elements are clear. Hjørland’s thought (2002) is most
helpful when he demonstrates that the conception of relevance is a mani-
festation—explicit or not—of a particular school of thought. The criteria
for relevance are derived from the epistemological framework within which
the researcher works. For example, if the researcher is an empiricist, rele-
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vance is related to observations, sense data, and not from outside authori-
ty or testimony (p. 117). It is essential to remember that the decisions re-
garding criteria for evaluation of relevance are grounded in a theoretical
stance, whether the theory is articulated or not. A criticism that emanates
from many quarters (many disciplines) is that the theory is, in general, far
too frequently unstated, even unrecognized. The sub-rosa aspect of theory
in LIS leads to problems of conceptualization, deﬁnition, assumption, eval-
uation, and, ultimately, understanding.
The View from Without
It is impossible to consider relevance without delving fairly deeply into
Sperber and Wilson’s (1986) book. Theirs has been the most substantive and
complete consideration of the cognitive elements of relevance as they re-
late to communication to date. LIS should pay attention to a few key aspects
of their position. One aspect (although not the most major one) is that, in
the communication process, interpreters are concerned with utterances
(complete, or nearly complete, statements, arguments, propositions, etc.),
rather than sentences. This seems minor, but it emphasizes that, as people
hear or read, they usually are not simply extracting individual and small parts
of a discourse; they are evaluating larger communicative acts. In customary
library and information-retrieval settings, individuals tend to be making
judgments about documents or substantial portions of documents.
Of greater interest here is an aspect that is more central to Sperber and
Wilson’s concept of relevance—context. They deﬁned context as “a psycho-
logical construct, a subset of the hearer’s assumptions about the world. It
is these assumptions, of course, rather than the actual state of the world,
that affect the interpretation of an utterance” (1986, p. 15). Anyone con-
sidering relevance seriously must heed the ﬁrst part of this deﬁnition (the
hearer’s or reader’s assumptions about the world). The second part, if not
examined further, could lead us down an unproductive path, though. It is
also essential that Sperber and Wilson wrote that context is determined by
more than the actual state of the world. If one were to interpret their deﬁni-
tion as meaning that context is independent of the world, then this would
represent an antirealist view of the world. A realist, even a weak realist, view
would necessitate that we accept that the state of the world, at the very least,
inﬂuences our assumptions. To afﬁrm that their position is not a completely
antirealist stance, they claim that mutual knowledge is vital to any relevance
assessment and, so, to communication. For mutual knowledge to be possi-
ble, there must be shared assumptions, which are most likely to come from
the common inﬂuence of the state of the world. The idea of mutual knowl-
edge applies in many information-related instances; the creator of a docu-
ment/utterance frequently has an audience (though sometimes an ideal
audience) in mind. The utterance, then, may be made with the knowledge
base of the audience taken into account. To the extent that there genuine-
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ly is mutual knowledge, there is the likelihood that members of that audi-
ence may ﬁnd relevance in the utterance.
What is most fruitful in the development of an idea of relevance by Sper-
ber and Wilson is their outline of the cognitive processes involved in the as-
sessment of relevance. This assessment depends on context, as deﬁned
above. Complicating the cognitive evaluation of relevance is the realization
that any hearer/reader constantly resides within the framework of multiple
contexts. This becomes obvious if we consider the actions of a student or
scholar living in a rich environment. At any given point in time, the individ-
ual is likely to be working on more than one project. Even when the indi-
vidual is consciously and intentionally trying to focus on one context (say
in conducting a search of a literature with the possible connection with one
project in mind), the other contexts do not simply disappear. To the extent
that the other contexts become conscious, the literature being assessed may
be assessed within more than one context. If the multiple contexts are re-
lated by content, then the assessment may be further complicated. The in-
dividual reviewing literature may read a given abstract to determine if the
related paper is relevant to the project. Something in the abstract, however,
is semantically connected to a second project, which shifts the individual’s
contextual state; the individual begins to read the abstract with the second
project in mind. It may be that, if there is a content relation between the
two projects, the assessment of the abstract within the context of the second
project affects the context of the ﬁrst project. In other words, as some writ-
ers within LIS have noted, relevance judgment is unavoidably dynamic.
Sperber and Wilson explicitly observed that any individual may be as-
sessing intuitions relating to relevance in multiple, and shifting, contexts,
and it is difﬁcult, if not impossible, for a third party to be certain within
which context assessment resides at any given moment. They wrote, “As a
discourse proceeds, the hearer retrieves or constructs and then processes
a number of assumptions. These form a gradually changing background
against which new information is processed” (1986, p. 118). Sperber and
Wilson offered another observation that is essential to a full consideration
of relevance—relevance judgment tends not to be a binary decision; rath-
er, it is an assessment made on a continuum. This means that the decision
is a relative one; utterance A may be deemed relevant but less relevant than
utterance B. One additional point by Sperber and Wilson (1986) must be
considered: “We have suggested that the context used to process new as-
sumptions is, essentially, a subset of the individual’s old assumptions, with
which the new assumptions combine to yield a variety of contextual effects”
(p. 132). Relevance judgment is dynamic because context is dynamic be-
cause assumptions are dynamic. New assumptions may be formed both on
the basis of old assumptions and leading to a transformation of old assump-
tions. As the transformation takes place, the judgment of the relevance of
a particular utterance is subject to change.
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The points made by Sperber and Wilson are useful and informative as
we in LIS consider relevance more fully. Their thought, of course, did not
spring fully formed without being inﬂuenced (contextually and via assump-
tions) by other writings and utterances. Two of these inﬂuential utteranc-
es (one tacit and one explicit; that is, one not referred to in their book and
the other one included in their bibliography) deserve brief treatment here.
The tacit inﬂuence is Ludwig Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations
(1958). In part, Sperber and Wilson appeared to be reacting against some
points by Wittgenstein. For example, Wittgenstein (1958) said, “A propo-
sition, and hence in another sense a thought, can be the ‘expression’ of
belief, hope, expectation, etc. But believing is not thinking. . . . The con-
cepts of believing, expecting, hoping are less distantly related to one an-
other than they are to the concept of thinking” (p. 154). His claim raises
the question of whether relevance judgment falls in the realm of belief or
of thought. The answer has decided implications for any inquiry into rele-
vance. It seems apparent that Sperber and Wilson did not follow Wittgen-
stein on this matter; they turned, in part, to some works by Jerry Fodor to
support an idea of greater coherence between such things as belief and
thought. Fodor (1975) maintained that meaningful use of language neces-
sitates at least some correspondence between an expressible belief and the
actual expression (in language) of the belief (p. 72). Wittgenstein, though,
posited a notion that requires addressing, even if there is no speciﬁc refer-
ence to his work. Curiously, this example could be taken to be indicative
of the complexity of relevance. While Wittgenstein was not cited in Sper-
ber and Wilson, his work is relevant, even if negatively in this singular in-
stance, to the program Sperber and Wilson set forth.
The explicit inﬂuential utterance referred to above is that of John
Searle (1983). Two points made by Searle sufﬁce to illustrate both the in-
dication of inﬂuence on Sperber and Wilson and some essential consider-
ations relating to relevance. First, Searle addressed the matter of commu-
nication from the standpoint of the speaker. If an utterance by a speaker is
to be meaningful, then the speaker must have had a set of intentions di-
rected at a set of hearers, at an audience. The set of intentions entails hav-
ing an effect on the audience (Searle, 1983, p. 161). The importance of this
point is to remind us that, as an individual judges the relevance of a docu-
ment (utterance), the judgment is inﬂuenced by the document itself, es-
pecially whether, at that moment, the individual falls into the category of
intended audience of the creator of the document. If the answer is yes, then
there is a higher probability (though almost impossible to calculate) that
there is a contextual connection between the individual and the document;
the individual’s assumptions are related to the content of the document.
Stated in Searle’s terms, a connection exists between the set of intentions
held by the individual seeking information and that set held by the speak-
er/author at the time of the uttering.
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Another point by Searle addressed the question regarding where rele-
vance resides. Sperber and Wilson emphasized their perceived importance
of an individual’s assumptions about the world (as opposed to the state of
the world). Searle (1983) reviewed the distinction (in the mind, or de dicto
beliefs, and beliefs that are about real objects, or de re beliefs). While the
evaluation of beliefs may be difﬁcult, he concludes that there can be both
de dicto and de re beliefs (pp. 208–210). If an individual is reviewing a re-
trieved set of documents, that individual may read one that states putative
facts about, say, cognitive processes employed in information retrieval. The
individual also may be reading another that argues for a particular kind of
behavior to be employed in reference transactions, based on claims of the
emotional state of the inquirer. An understanding of the assumptions un-
derlying assessment of these two documents requires attention to the na-
ture of content of the documents. Assessment of the content is itself sub-
ject to kinds of epistemic justiﬁcation. The one document may be deemed
justiﬁed on the grounds of physical evidence of cognitive processes; the
other may be deemed justiﬁed on the grounds of effective argumentation.
Clearly in Searle, but also apparent in Sperber and Wilson, both kinds of
beliefs are integral to relevance judgment.
Searle’s insights are certainly valuable for any consideration of rele-
vance, but it should be noted that his position represents one of at least a
few possible stances regarding meaning. For any document or utterance to
be judged relevant, it stands to reason, that document or utterance should
be deemed meaningful by the reader or hearer. Speech acts, which form
the core of Searle’s concern, can be assessed as potentially meaningful.
These speech acts, however, tend to be assessed on the grounds of the
matter or content they communicate (a second conception of meaning).
Paul Grice (1989) demonstrated that the kinds of communication that
generally are considered when attention is turned to relevance (that is,
formal assertions based on evidence or logic) are accompanied by particu-
lar communicative intentions. The intention is usually to communicate the
substance of the idea or thought that the speaker/writer has to an audience.
Grice’s position is dependent on an even more fundamental notion of
meaning (a third conception) as an explanation of “what it is to think that
P, what it is to believe that P, to desire that P, etc.” (Harman, 1999, p. 158).
This notion attempts to theorize on the nature of a language of the mind
that allows for communication that can be comprehended internally by the
thinker and then communicated to someone else. While this third concep-
tion is important, the ﬁrst two have more direct relationship to an under-
standing of relevance.
Borrowing from another work from outside LIS, while systemic con-
cerns are present within our ﬁeld for the consideration of relevance (i.e.,
answering the question of whether the information system—database, ser-
vice, etc.—meets the information need of the inquirer), it may be that “sys-
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tem” is even more useful metaphorically. Patrick de Gramont (1990) took
this tack when he compared the workings of language to a ﬁling system.
He wrote:
Filing systems have two distinguishing characteristics which enable one
to compare them to the way language works. First, they operate on the
basis of the fact that the information to be ﬁled has meaning before it
is ﬁled. Second, the system under which the information is ﬁled is
geared, not to the information per se, but to an ulterior purpose. For
example, if I ﬁle my correspondence alphabetically, the classiﬁcation
I use has nothing to do with the correspondence in itself; rather it is a
function of wanting to retrieve letters easily and efﬁciently. (p. 65)
De Gramont hastened to add that while this metaphor effectively illustrates
the ways we employ language for particular purposes, purposes may become
conﬂated and render meaning difﬁcult. De Gramont (1990) said that the
meaning of a ﬁle (that is, the categorical meaning it has so that items can
be attached to it) is not the same as the meaning of the content within the
ﬁle; the categorization, being an organizing technique, is ineffective as a
meaningful indicator of speciﬁc content (p. 69). One reason for the difﬁcul-
ty is that the employment of language for the purpose of categorization
(ﬁling) tends to be an application of process rules, and not necessarily re-
lated to meaning.
De Gramont’s metaphor maps onto our disciplinary concern regard-
ing relevance. The system-based work on relevance that characterizes some
IS literature is, if de Gramont is correct, not only limited, but also mislead-
ing. If the initial concern is determination of the relevance of documents
retrieved from an information system (including a library), then the vital
matter of the meaningfulness of possible connection of the intention of the
searcher, the stated search, and the retrieved output is forgotten. As the
process moves from stage to stage, some transformation, along the lines of
the metaphor of the ﬁling system, occurs. The searcher’s intention is trans-
lated into a query, which is further transformed through the mapping of
search terms onto document representations. Serious inquiry into relevance
judgment should not ignore the transformative processes that take place
along the way. Applying de Gramont’s thought to relevance might prompt
the profession to think seriously, apropos of Mizzaro, about the two clus-
ters of work on relevance, and especially whether the separation into two
clusters not only misses the point of relevance but also possibly perpetuates
a mistaken notion of system and human operating independently. This is
not to say that there is no awareness that the two clusters are really only two
emphases within an interrelated phenomenon; there is certainly work that
does integrate the two.
One additional view from the outside can help demonstrate the more
particular concerns associated with relevance judgment that may be a part
of a dialogic process (e.g., reference transactions). While a number of think-
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ers could enlighten us, one philosopher in particular has addressed mat-
ters of communicative action—Jürgen Habermas. In one speciﬁc work
Habermas (1998) has critiqued some standard theories of meaning and has
found them wanting. A primary difﬁculty with these theories is that they
tend to be constituted almost entirely in language itself and not in what
Habermas referred to as the pragmatic relationship between speakers and
hearers that can be both linguistic and extralinguistic (p. 280). What is
missing in such a case is a lack of attention to action—theoretic contexts
in which meaning may be realized. As mentioned above, Birger Hjørland
in our ﬁeld has attempted just such a connection between meaning and
action theory. According to Habermas, traditional theory has not fully aban-
doned a certain articulation of semiotics wherein an object-centered idea
of knowledge holds that meaning (signiﬁed) relates to a sign (signiﬁer) in
the same limited way that a potentially meaningful sign (symbol) relates to
the signiﬁed object (designatum) (p. 281).
Habermas offered a replacement for the traditional theory by empha-
sizing the tripartite objective of “a speaker reaching understanding/ with
another person/ about something” (p. 293). He added to the dynamic com-
bination of de dicto and de re beliefs affecting meaning by explicitly recog-
nizing the shared social world in which communication resides (p. 296).
His addition of this component has the effect of clarifying that, rather than
being a linear, objectiﬁed process, communication (and relevance judg-
ment) is a dynamic and transformative force that can enable understand-
ing to take place.
The telos of reaching understanding inherent in the structures of lan-
guage compels the communicative actors to alter their perspective; this
shift in perspective ﬁnds expression in the necessity of going from the
objectivating attitude of the success-oriented actor, who seeks to effect
something in the world, to the performative attitude of a speaker, who
seeks to reach understanding with a second person about something.
(Habermas, 1998, p. 300)
Any dialogic effort to determine the relevance of documents or utterances
depends on the kind of teleological stance of which Habermas speaks. This
means that, from the professional point of view, it is not sufﬁcient to rec-
ognize a simply stated goal of service; a more robust and rich articulation
of purpose is required to meet the goal of ﬁnding relevance in a dynamic
and complex environment.
Summary
In recent writings, representatives from the IS ﬁeld have recognized the
dynamic and complex nature of relevance and relevance judgments. Some
of these writers go so far as to delve into work beyond LIS. The reality,
however, is that such treatments are limited. Furthermore, consideration
of relevance is to be found in the IS literature, rather than in the literature
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on librarianship. As is the case with any absence, reasons are left to specu-
lation. It may be that librarians read the IS literature and learn from it. It
may be that librarians tacitly believe that practice effectively embraces rel-
evance in the form of reference service and measures such as user satisfac-
tion. When we traverse beyond our own literature, we can readily see a rich-
ness of thought relating to language, context, content, and other factors
that are closely connected to relevance. The potential for understanding
and misunderstanding may be the most fundamental of ideas that can guide
the inquiry and practice in which relevance holds a central place.
When Habermas’s critique of theories of meaning is considered, the
challenge of understanding what relevance is and how it can be assessed
becomes clear. Habermas, more so than many other writers on language
and communication, comprehends the inherently dialogic nature of com-
munication. To ground an examination of relevance even more explicitly
in dialogic communication, the work of Mikhail Bakhtin should be consid-
ered. Bakhtin, more effectively than anyone else, has captured the elusive
quality of dialogue. Underlying his program is the claim that all communi-
cation is dialogic or monologic. Monologic communication allows no re-
sponse, no appropriation by a reader or hearer; it simply is as it is stated.
Dialogic communication requires interaction between hearer and speak-
er, between writer and reader. This kind of communication also requires
the admission that “Language is not a neutral medium that passes freely
and easily into the private property of the speaker’s intentions; it is popu-
lated—overpopulated—with the intentions of others. Expropriating it,
forcing it to submit to one’s own intentions and accents, is a difﬁcult and
complicated process” (Bakhtin, 1981, p. 294).
We may be tempted, especially given the force of a narrow empiricist
tradition in our ﬁeld, to presume that a relevance judgment is not subject
to multiple, sometimes competing, intentions, that the information-seek-
er imposes her intentions on the document/utterance. The full realization
of relevance entails what Michael Bernard-Donals (1994) called the epis-
temological foundation of Bakhtin’s work—“the I–other relationship that
takes place between humans through the creation of signs (and more
speciﬁcally, with language). . . . [H]umans are radically ‘other’ in relation
to each other, but it is this relationship that deﬁnes human understanding,
and all epistemologies must come to terms with it, as Bakhtin’s does” (p.
43). As is stated early in this paper, relevance is necessarily connected to
knowledge. An understanding of the phenomenon of relevance also neces-
sitates examination that transcends a linguistics analysis that ignores the
dialogic nature of communication. Bakhtin (1986) summed up what ide-
ally occurs in relevance assessment:
The transcription of thinking in the human sciences is always the tran-
scription of a special kind of dialogue: the complex interrelations be-
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tween the text (the object of study and reﬂection) and the created, fram-
ing context (questioning, refuting, and so forth) in which the scholar’s
cognizing and evaluating thought takes place. This is the meeting of
two texts—of the ready-made and the reactive text being created—and,
consequently, the meeting of two subjects and two authors. (pp. 106–
107)
Any dynamic conception of relevance requires an understanding of the
dialogic, and essentially phenomenological, process of communication. As
Emmanuel Levinas (1969) has told us, discourse involves the production
of meaning, not merely an ideal meaning, but one that is grounded in the
present act of reading/hearing the words of the writer/speaker (p. 66). A
judgment of relevance is likewise grounded in the present. This brief ex-
amination demonstrates that fruitful thought from philosophy, language,
and semantics can help LIS delve more deeply into the study of relevance.
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